Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

State of Utah v. Barton V. McFarland : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; attorneys for appellee.
Samuel P. Newton; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. McFarland, No. 20101031 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2691

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BARTON V. MCFARLAND
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20101031-CA

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from a conviction for Forgery, a Third Degree Felony in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 and False Personal Information, a Class A
Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507(2), in the Second
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, Judge,
presiding.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

SAMUEL P. NEWTON (9935)
WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of Criminal Justice
1206 University Circle
Ogden, Utah 84408-1206

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

K^

a(A*« 6

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

BARTON V. MCFARLAND
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20101031-CA

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from a conviction for Forgery, a Third Degree Felony in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 and False Personal Information, a Class A
Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507(2), in the Second
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, Judge,
presiding.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

SAMUEL P. NEWTON (9935)
WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of Criminal Justice
1206 University Circle
Ogden, Utah 84408-1206

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

IV

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT

1

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

6

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING
MR. MCFARLAND TO PRISON

6

CONCLUSION

17

Addendum A (Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22)

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400

15

Bluff v. Utah, 2002 UT 66, 52 P.3d 1210

6

Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1986)
Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)

12
11, 12

Lewis v. State, 530 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)

11

People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972)

9

People v. Smice, 223 N.E.2d 548 (111. App. 1967)

11

State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 16, 95 P.3d 276

14

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)

13, 14

State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998)

8, 9

State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997)

8

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346

13

State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 42 (Utah 1996).

16

State v. Howell, 707P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)

6

State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993)

6

State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)

7

State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 41, 192 P.3d 867

14

State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980)

7

State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, 113 P.3d 992
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

11, 14
1

State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19

15

State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

14

State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957)

7

State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993).
State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746 (Utah 1986)

11
7

iv

State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, affd, State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46,
79 P.3d 937

7

State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937

11

State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

6

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) 15
STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507(2)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507(2),

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

1
RULES

Utah Code Judical Conduct Rule 2.2

12

Utah Code Judicial Conduct Rule 2.6(A)

12

UtahR. Crim. Pro. 22—

6, 10, 11, 14
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. Amend. IV

2

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

2

Utah Const. Art. I § 14

2

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

BARTON V. MCFARLAND
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20101031-CA

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a conviction for Forgery, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 and False Personal Information, a Class A Misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507(2), in the Second District Court, State of Utah,
the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, Judge, presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue I: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. McFarland to
prison.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

These issues were not preserved by Mr. McFarland's counsel, consequently, the
matters should be reviewed for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. IV and XIV, Utah Const. Art. I §
14, Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 and Utah Code Ann. § 76-8507(2) (2010).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 9, 2010 the State filed an information charging the defendant with
Forgery on June 21,2010. R. 2. On October 14, 2010, the defendant entered a guilty plea
to Counts 1 and 5 of the information. R. 58. Counts 2, 3, and 4 were dismissed in
exchange for that plea. Id. In addition, the State recommended, at the time of plea, "to
recommend a concurrent sentence and 402(2) treatment upon successful completion of
probation." Id. However, at sentencing, the State indicated that it was not aware of the
defendant's federal record, and as such, would not abide by the plea agreement. R. 59.
The trial court indicated to the defendant that he had the opportunity to withdraw his plea,
and after consultation with counsel, defendant asked to proceed with sentencing and was
sentenced to prison. Id. On June 21, 2010, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 46.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On October 14, 2010, the defendant entered a guilty plea to forgery, admitting that
he passed a forged check at Andy's restaurant. R. 58:4. The State agreed to "recommend
2

402-2 treatment... upon successful completion of probation." R. 58:2. On November 22,
2010, the defendant was sentenced by the trial court to a prison commitment. At
sentencing, defense counsel informed the court of the State's recommendation of 402-2
treatment. R. 59:2. Counsel asserted that Mr. McFarland's "criminal history ... may not
warrant a prison commitment." R. 59:2. Admitting Mr. McFarland's involvement with
the federal system, defense counsel indicated that Mr. McFarland's history consisted of
"mostly misdemeanors." R. 59:2. Mr. McFarland had served six months in jail, and
according to counsel, had a "very supportive family network" who "wanted to do what
they could to help" him. R. 59:2-3.
The court asked the State why it recommended probation when Mr. McFarland
had "an extensive criminal history ... plus a prison commitment." R. 59:4. The State
indicated it was unaware of the federal prison commitment and that "I wouldn't have
done this if I had realized he had gone to federal prison." R. 59:4. The State then
indicated that it would support the withdrawl of Mr. McFarland's plea. R. 59:4-5. The
court agreed. R. 59:5. At this point, Mr. McFarland indicated that he "was under the
assumption that I would get time served with possible probation" and that the AP&P
officer told him that he would not "do prison time." R. 59:5.
The court told Mr. McFarland that AP&P was recommending prison and then
stated its own opinion:
You have an extensive criminal history, including a prison commitment. I think
based on that, I think it is a prison case, so if you want to withdraw your plea I'll
allow you to do that.
3

R. 59:5. Mr. McFarland asked the court to consider a work release program, and the court
stated that "based on the recommendation that's in front of me, I think it's a prison
commitment case, so there would be no work release." R. 59:6. Again, the court stated,
[I]t would be mind [sic] that you should go to prison, so if you feel that the
other—that the previous negotiation was—that you made was predicated on
having probation, then I'm willing to allow you to withdraw your plea and we'll
set it for trial. It's your call.
R. 59:7. Mr. McFarland asked the court how long a prison commitment would be and the
court said that it didn't know, that defense counsel "might have a better feel" but that
"there's presently a prison overcrowding, and that sentences are being shortened." R.
59:7.
At this point, Mr. McFarland conferred with defense counsel, who indicated "I
guess we're still going forward." R. 59:7. Defense counsel stated:
Mr. McFarland does have an extensive state history, it's you know, misdemeanors.
He did have this one federal charge on which he served time with the Bureau of
Prisons, but I think really that stemmed from basically a simultaneous state case,
and the state handed it off to the feds in that regard. It was a drug case and
possession of a firearm. Your Honor, I think Mr. McFarland has kind of gotten
with the wrong people. I know that that happens to people that come into the
court, but I think it's mixed up a lot of especially true for him. I think he could
succeed, you know, on probation. I'm sure that he will succeed no matter what he
does. Your Honor, I would just plead with you to give him a chance and let him do
probation.
R. 59:8. Mr. McFarland then stated:
I just ask for the same, your Honor, if you can be fair and - I'd really like a
chance to get out and work and get on with my life. I know I've made some
mistakes, and I have been around the wrong people. I've had six months in Weber
County to where I've gotten to get back in view of my life and what - in
perspective of where I should be going and what I need to do. I don't feel that 4

I'd like to get out and work and get my life put back together, your Honor, and I
just plead that you give me a chance.
R. 59:8.
The court noted that other than the 2004 prison commitment, Mr. McFarland
appeared to have no other felony convictions. R. 59:8-9. The State indicated its reasoning
for prison focused on the fact that "all criminals should understand that, 'Once I've been
[to prison] I'm going to go back every time.'" R. 59:9. It also indicated that defendant
failed federal probation. R. 59:9.
Mr. McFarland attempted to clarify his federal sentence:
On my federal probation I got three years probation, and I was fine. Twoand-a-half years into it I changed jobs, and I was living in Bear Lake building
homes, and my parole officer wasn't up there. It changed, I got a new parole
officer, and they violated me because I switched jobs, and he said I wasn't in
contact with him. I did the last six months in Davis County.
I didn't have a lot of violations. I did really well in the federal court except
for changing jobs and not — and he said that I didn't tell him, but we had a
miscommunication, but I did terminate my federal parole in '08, and I didn't have
— I just had the one violation, which was switching jobs.
R. 59:10. The court commented on Mr. McFarland's unsuccessful termination of
probation in 2004, which Mr. McFarland indicated that he did not even start. R. 59:10. It
then indicated that he absconded after being released from prison. R. 59:10. Mr.
McFarland denied that allegation. R. 59:10-11. The court indicated Mr. McFarland was
sent back to prison and upon his release terminated his probation unsuccessfully. R.
59:11. It then sentenced him to prison. R. 59:11.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court failed to consider all of the relevant mitigating factors before
sentencing Mr. McFarland to prison. Specifically, and perhaps most grievously, the trial
court pronounced a sentence without taking the opportunity to hear any evidence in
mitigation. The court announced its sentence at the start of the proceeding, and though it
allowed the defendant an opportunity to speak, the trial court clearly intended to send the
defendant to prison despite anything he said or presented in mitigation. These errors
constitute an abuse of discretion in sentencing and since they were not preserved by
counsel, they may be reviewed for plain error and ineffective assistance. See Utah R.
Crim. Pro. 22(a).
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING MR, MCFARLAND TO PRISON
The trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "The trial court abuses its
discretion when it fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed
exceeds the limits prescribed by law." Bluff v. Utah, 2002 UT 66, f 66, 52 P.3d 1210
(citations omitted). Further, the Due Process Clause "require[s] that a sentencing judge
act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a
sentence." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); see State v. Johnson, 856
P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993).
6

"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of
his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah
1980). Although sentencing judges have "discretion in determining what punishment fits
both the crime and the offender," Utah courts seek "to shore up the soundness and
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that
sentencing discretion." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980).
Thus, a trial court does not have discretion to violate the defendant's due process
"right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information regarding his crime, his
background, and the interests of society." State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f34, 31
P.3d 615, affd, State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^[19, 79 P.3d 937 ("one purpose of the
right to 711ocate . . . is to ensure that the judge is provided with reasonably reliable and
relevant information regarding sentencing"); see State v. Sweat, 111 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah
1986) ("so long as basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural fairness
are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in considering 'any and all information
that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence'" (citation omitted)); State v. Lipsky, 608
P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) ("fundamental fairness" requires that sentence be based
only upon "accurate information"); State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) (court
abuses its discretion if it bases sentence upon "wholly irrelevant, improper or
inconsequential consideration").

7

Information that is relevant to sentencing includes information related to the
defendant's rehabilitation, punishment, incapacitation, restitution, and deterrence. See
State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1997) ("The traditional justifications for
punishment in the criminal law include retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation.'" (citation omitted)).
In State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), for example, defendant was convicted
of three counts of aggravated robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years
before being sentenced. See GallU 967 P.2d at 932. On appeal, this Court held the trial
court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences because: (1) defendant's
crimes were "very serious crimes—all first degree felonies," but "the record show[ed]
that [the trial court] may not have given adequate weight to certain mitigating
circumstances," including the fact defendant "did not inflict any physical injuries," only
used a "pellet gun," and took a "relatively small" amount of money; (2) defendant's
history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction,"
and his act of absconding only provided "nominal support" since he was not charged with
bail jumping; (3) although defendant's "offenses and flight from justice reflected]
negatively on his character," he "voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility,"
"expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself," and, while in Minnesota,
"obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a productive individual"; and (4)
concurrent sentencing "better serve[ed]" his "rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board
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of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine
progress toward rehabilitation." Id. at 938.
Applying the Galli factors to the case at hand, the trial court failed to give
adequate weight to the mitigating factors at issue here. Mr. McFarland's offense involved
passing a forged check. First, this was not a crime of violence of such a serious nature as
to merit prison. See People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972) (finding that a
20-year prison commitment for a non-violent crime violated the United States and
Michigan constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment). At no point
did Mr. McFarland hurt or injure another person. Like Galli, Mr. McFarland's case
involved a relatively small amount of money—a check at a restaurant. The trial court
paid no attention to this evidence in mitigation. Second, the defendant's state criminal
history consisted only of misdemeanor offenses. His state criminal history, by the
prosecutor's own admission, would not ordinarily carry a prison recommendation. See R.
58:2. Additionally, the defendant's record contained only one felony conviction—a 2004
federal prison commitment. R. 59:8-9. In fact, the State reasoned that Mr. McFarland
ought to be returned to prison automatically—the prosecutor's opinion was that once
someone had been to prison, he should always go back, no matter the circumstances. R.
59:9. The trial court in this case gave little, or no, weight to the relatively minor nature of
defendant's criminal history. Third, the defendant confessed readily to this offense,
entered a guilty plea, and never denied responsibility. He took responsibility and
indicated he had learned from this experience and that the six months of jail he did helped
9

him learn from his mistake. At no point did the trial court ever consider or weigh this
evidence in mitigation.
Additionally, however, and perhaps even more problematic, the trial court
pronounced sentence before hearing any evidence in mitigation and seemed inclined to
give prison no matter what evidence it heard. The court, when confronted with the State's
probation recommendation asked why the State would give that recommendation when
the defendant had "an extensive criminal history ... plus a prison commitment." R. 59:4.
The court then told Mr. McFarland that
You have an extensive criminal history, including a prison commitment. I think
based on that, I think it is a prison case, so if you want to withdraw your plea I'll
allow you to do that.
R. 59:5. Again, the court stated,
[I]t would be mind [sic] that you should go to prison, so if you feel that the
other—that the previous negotiation was—that you made was predicated on
having probation, then I'm willing to allow you to withdraw your plea and we'll
set it for trial. It's your call.
R. 59:7.
After all of these pronouncements, the court proceeded into full sentencing where
defense counsel and Mr. McFarland addressed the court. In other words, the court did not
address evidence in mitigation until after it had already pronounced its intention. The
sentencing hearing became a sham in which the court had already made its decision.
Courts are prohibited from entering sentencing judgments until they have heard
evidence in mitigation. See, Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22(a) ("Before imposing sentence the
court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any
10

information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed."); State v. Wanosik 2003 UT 46, ^ 21, 79 P.3d 937 ("We believe that the
'shall afford' language in [Rule 22] requires the court to affirmatively provide the
defense an opportunity to present mitigating information concerning sentencing.").
The trial court is charged with identifying, on the record, the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that affect its sentencing decision, because "sentencing
should be conducted with full information and with careful deliberation of all
relevant factors.1' State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993). A trial court's
failure to discharge this duty will result in the case being remanded for
resentencing with instructions that the trial court consider all of the circumstances
relevant to the sentencing decision. See id.;
State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200,% 10, 113 P.3d 992. See also Gonzalez v. Goldstein,
633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (ordering prohibition after judge indicated his
desire to give the defendant the maximum sentence before hearing mitigating evidence);
Lewis v. State, 530 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (reversing sentence after trial judge
announced that he would impose the maximum penalty if the case were tried); People v.
Smice, 223 N.E.2d 548, 551 (111. App. 1967) ("Generally, trial courts cannot properly
sentence offenders without a presentence or probationary report and without a hearing on
aggravation and mitigation. Absent the information furnished thereby, reviewing courts
are asked to make decisions in a vacuum.")
In Gonzalez, the judge told defense counsel prior to sentencing that he intended to
pronounce the maximum sentence. The court held that a
trial judge's announced intention before a scheduled hearing to make a specific
ruling, regardless of any evidence or argument to the contrary, is the paradigm of
judicial bias and prejudice. We could not imagine a more telling basis for a party
to fear that he will not receive a fair hearing. See Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240
11

(Fla. 1986). Nor can we take seriously the state's response that in so announcing
the judge "was merely doing his job" as commanded by our mandate. We
instructed the judge to resentence within the guidelines. We did not, however,
instruct him to impose the maximum sentence permitted by the guidelines. He was
entirely free under our mandate to impose a period of punishment at the lowest
end of the punishment scale. His announced intention to give the maximum
regardless of anything from defendant cannot conceivably constitute mere
compliance with our directions.
Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
According to the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, "[a] judge shall accord to every
person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be
heard according to law." Rule 2.6(A). Additionally, a "judge shall uphold and apply the
law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially." Rule 2.2. In this
case, the judge over-valued the aggravating factors and failed to impartially consider the
mitigating factors.
While both defense counsel and the defendant were provided an opportunity to
address the court, their arguments were largely perfunctory. The court stated its intention
to impose prison before any evidence in mitigation was presented. The trial court argued
with the defendant about his assertions which were contrary to its opinion. For example,
Mr. McFarland denied being unsuccessfully terminated from probation and that he
absconded. R. 59:10-11. The court merely heard the statement and immediately
sentenced him to prison. The court had previously made up its mind that it would
sentence the defendant to prison and it refused to listen to defendant's arguments or to
consider any of the evidence in mitigation.

12

The trial court should have demonstrated impartiality and listened to all of the
evidence before it, particularly the defendant's evidence in mitigation, before it reached a
conclusion about the appropriate sentence. In this case, the trial court inappropriately
made its decision prior to the introduction of mitigating evidence.
Plain Error. The trial court's failure to consider mitigating evidence constitutes
plain error. "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised
on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). "The
preservation rule serves two important policies." Id. "First, 'in the interest of orderly
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and,
if appropriate, correct it.'" Id. (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989)).
"Second, a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the
strategy of 'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy
fails,... claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse.'" Id. (citation omitted). "To
serve these policies, [the Court] ha[s] held that the preservation rule applies to every
claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred."/*/, (citations omitted).
"The plain error exception enables the appellate court to 'balance the need for
procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.'" Id. at ^[13 (citation omitted). '"At
bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the Court] to avoid injustice.'" Id.
(citation omitted). "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n

13

error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful... .'"Id. (citationomitted).
As to the first prong, it clearly would be erroneous for court to fail to consider
mitigating evidence as part of sentencing, as detailed infra pp. 6-13.
As to the second prong,
An error is obvious when "the law governing the error was clear at the time the
alleged error was made.1' State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 16, 95 P.3d 276. An error
may be obvious if a review of the plain language of the relevant statute reveals the
error. See State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 41, 192 P.3d 867. Rule 22(a) of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the court to allow the defendant the opportunity to present mitigating
evidence. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 22(a). Additionally, as this court said in Moreno, failure
to conduct a "careful deliberation" of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances
warrants reversal of the sentence. State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, f 10, 113 P.3d
992. Defendant contends that by announcing its decision at the outset, the trial court
failed to conduct a careful deliberation, as mandated by the rules.
As to the third prong,
An error is harmful if it is "of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). "This harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in
assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,143, 192 P.3d 867. In this case, clearly a failure to adequately
consider the defendant's evidence in mitigation, harmed his case, and like Moreno,
requires reversal of the sentence. The trial court, had it conducted a more thorough
14

inquiry, could have more carefully balanced the evidence in favor of the defendant and
against him. If Mr. McFarland were sentenced only according to the aggravating
circumstances, which appears to be the case here, then his outcome would certainly have
been different had the court considered evidence in mitigation.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must show that his counsel's "performance both falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness and prejudices his client." Adams v. State, 2005 UT
62, P 25, 123 P.3d 400 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant
must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a
reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. To satisfy the first part of the test,
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered
adequate assistance.
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ^ 22, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
The Ott case is particularly instructive. In that case, defense counsel failed to
object to victim impact testimony which was presented at his sentencing hearing. The
testimony surrounded the victims' feelings if Ott were to be released and their opinions as
to his ability to be rehabilitated. Id. at lfi}26-32. The Supreme Court found these
statements to be highly prejudicial and inadmissible in a sentencing hearing. Id. at \ 33.
Counsel's failure to object to the admission of these statements constituted ineffective
15

assistance of counsel, partially because the United States Supreme Court had specifically
prohibited this kind of testimony. "[I]f the evidence ha[s] no conceivable beneficial value
to [the defendant], the failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy." Id. at %
38, citing State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 42 (Utah 1996).
In this case, the court's blanket statement that it would sentence the defendant to
prison before it heard any evidence in mitigation clearly exceeds the court's allowable
discretion. There would be "no conceivable beneficial value" for defense counsel's
failure to object to the court's sentencing practices here. Because of this reason alone,
counsel's performance was objectively deficient—no rational reason exists for counsel to
allow the court to sentence a defendant without considering the mitigating evidence.
Second, as detailed in the above section on plain error, had the court actually considered
the mitigating evidence in this case: 1) that no violent offense occurred, 2) that the
amount taken was minimal, 3) that defendant's criminal history consisted largely of
misdemeanors, then there was a substantial likelihood that he would have received a
probation sentence as opposed to a prison commitment.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's failures constitute an abuse of discretion, and as such, this matter
ought to be reversed and remanded for a proper sentencing hearing.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of J ^ ^ f H _ _ , 2011.

2MQi

P. NEWfOlT
for the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time
for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or
plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending
sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause
why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a
warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence
and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and
the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of
defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined
in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a
result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any
firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for
withdrawal of the plea.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true
copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment
and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at
any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally
ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. §
77-16a-202(1)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.

